Coherence, consistency, and cohesion: Clade selection in Okasha and beyond by Haber, Matthew & Hamilton, Andrew
Coherence, Consistency, and Cohesion: 
Clade Selection in Okasha and Beyond
Matthew H. Haber and Andrew H a m ilto n ";
Sam ir O kasha argues th a t clade selection is an  incoherent concept, because the relation 
th a t constitutes clades is such th a t it renders parent-offspring (reproduction) relations 
between clades impossible. He reasons th a t since clades cannot reproduce, it is not 
coherent to  speak o f n a tu ra l selection operating a t the clade level. We argue, however, 
th a t when species-level lineages and clade-level lineages are treated  consistently ac ­
cording to  standard  cladist com m itm ents, clade reproduction  is indeed possible and 
clade selection is coherent if  certain  conditions obtain. Despite clade selection's logical 
coherence, however, we share some o f O kasha 's pessimism. W hether o r no t clades are 
a  unit o f  selection is ultim ately a question  o f em pirical support and theoretical im port.
1. Introduction. In a recent article, Samir Okasha argues that selection 
for clades—described as groups of species that include a common ancestor 
and all its descendents—is either species selection by another name, or is 
logically incoherent because clades do not reproduce (Okasha 2003, 749). 
We argue, however, that in the absence of good reasons to do otherwise, 
consistency demands that standard cladist concepts of species, species 
extinction, and the species parent-offspring relation—commitments Oka­
sha accepts—should be used in the generation of cladist analogues of 
these concepts as applied to clades. In Section 3 we show how such con­
cepts can be understood by offering an analysis of a species-level lineage 
and the clade-level relationships that arise from it. On our view, clade
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selection is both distinct from species selection and is conceptually co­
herent for the cladist if species selection is.
Mere coherency, however, is too a low a threshold by which to judge 
the quality of a concept. Tn Section 4 we ask whether the cladist view of 
clade selection is empirically plausible or of theoretical import. Here we 
are more pessimistic, and argue that (1) competition among clades is 
precluded in ways that it is not precluded among species, (2) clades may 
lack the relevant cohesion generating relations (CGRs) (and subsequent 
disruptions) that are present at the level of species, and (3) clades seem 
only rarely to share selective environments.1 Tt is these differences that 
ultimately allow species-level and clade-level lineages to be treated dif­
ferently by the cladist with respect to a functional account of selection2 
(though not with respect to such basic cladist concepts as the parent- 
offspring relation or the generation-extinction relation). Consistency does 
not require cladists to be committed to clade selection merely because it 
is coherent.
2. Okasha on Clade Reproduction. Okasha’s central claim is that the con­
cept of clade selection is logically incoherent because clades do not re­
produce. The motivation is easy to see. Every responsible account of how 
selection works has it that selection modifies the composition of a pop­
ulation—be it cells, genes, organisms, demes, species, or clades—through 
the differential reproduction of heritable traits (Lewontin 1970; Maynard 
Smith 1987). Tf clades don’t reproduce, then it is incoherent to claim that 
they are a locus of selection.
According to Okasha, clades cannot be said to reproduce because clades 
do not meet two necessary conditions for reproduction. Namely, the con­
ditions that like must beget like (LMBL) and that offspring must be 
capable of independent existence (TE). These conditions can be stated as 
follows:
(LMBL). Parent and offspring must both be entities at the same level 
in the biological hierarchy. (Okasha 2003, 743)
(TE). An act of reproduction must result in the production of an 
offspring entity which has an independent existence of its parental 
entity, in the sense that it can continue to exist when its parent dies, 
at least in principle. . . . [I]f two entities are related as parent and
1. E lihu  G erso n  first suggested th is p o in t a b o u t C G R s (and w h a t to  call them ) to  
us. H e shou ld  n o t be held responsib le, however, fo r w ha t we’ve done  w ith it.
2. T h is presum es, o f  course, th a t  there  is a m ean ingfu l d is tin c tio n  betw een species 
and clades. T his is no t, however, a view held by all cladists; som e co n tend  th a t 
th e  ra n k  o f species is u n h elp fu l and ou g h t to  be ab an d o n ed  (M ish ler 1999).
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Figure  1. Sim ple c lad o g ram  show ing lineage re la tions am ong  v erteb rates. M ore 
inclusive clades are a t the  b o tto m , w ith c lades (subclades) becom ing increasingly  
less inclusive to w ard  th e  top .
offspring, it must be possible for them to become related as ancestor 
and descendant in the future. (Okasha 2003, 743)
According to Okasha, clades fail to meet both the LMBL and TE con­
ditions—and thus do not reproduce—because a clade just is a monophy- 
letic group of species, where monophyly is understood to mean that clades 
are comprised of an ancestral species and all of its descendents (Okasha 
2003, 745; Hennig 1966; Wiley 1981). This being the case, Okasha reasons, 
every relation between a more inclusive clade and a less inclusive one is 
by definition a relation of a whole to a proper part, rather than a parent- 
offspring relation. The simple cladogram in Figure 1 illustrates Okasha’s 
thinking.
On Okasha’s reading of cladistics, the clade ‘tetrapods’ is contained as 
a proper part within the clade ‘vertebrates’, just as the clades ‘mammals’ 
and ‘amphibians’ are contained as proper parts within the clade ‘tetra- 
pods’. These clade relations do not satisfy the necessary conditions for 
reproduction relations because:
1. The ancestor of any of the less inclusive clades toward the top of 
the cladogram cannot be a clade; rather, “it can only be a species” 
(Okasha 2003, 745). Thus, the LMBL condition is violated.
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2. The clade ‘tetrapods’ cannot outlive the clade ‘vertebrates’. If the 
vertebrates go extinct, all the tetrapods will go extinct as well, since 
“the only way a monophyletic clade can cease to exist is if all its 
constituent species go extinct, which implies that all the subclades 
which are parts of it must cease to exist too” (Okasha 2003, 745). 
Thus, the IE condition is violated.
These two claims mirror Okasha’s general thesis about clade selection. 
The first, if true, will show that, ceteris paribus, clade selection is species 
selection by another name, since the relevant ancestor is a species rather 
than a clade. In this case we have a species begetting the descendent species 
that make up clades, not clades begetting clades. The second claim, if 
true, will show that clade selection is incoherent because the relations 
between clades that monophyly requires will not allow less inclusive clades 
to exist independently of more inclusive ones.
We accept LMBL and IE as necessary conditions for reproduction and 
grant that if either (1) or (2) prove to be the case, there fails to be a 
reproduction relation and clade selection either collapses into species se­
lection or becomes conceptually incoherent. In the next section, however, 
we show that cladists are not forced to accept (1) or (2), since they can 
apply their analysis of species concepts to clades in just the way that 
consistency demands they should, as well as in a way that respects the 
LMBL and IE conditions.
3. The Cladist Concept of Species and Its Clade-Level Analogue. Okasha’s 
argument presumes a cladist perspective. Here, we accept this perspective 
without debate, and our arguments should be understood as operating 
within the accepted canons of cladism. Broadly speaking, we take the 
cladist perspective to be a commitment to representing ancestral condi­
tions and evolutionary relationships using phylogenetic systematics as a 
framework. More specifically to the case at hand, cladists are committed 
to the unintuitive but useful notion that “when a lineage splits the ancestral 
species automatically goes extinct, even if it is phenotypically indistin­
guishable from one of the daughter species” (Okasha 2003, 740). That is, 
whenever there is a speciation event, two new species are created, even if 
one of the new species has all the properties of the ancestor species— 
indeed, even if one of the new species is populated by all the same in­
dividuals as the ancestor species (Ridley 1989). Figure 2 graphically il­
lustrates this view of lineage splits (though care needs be taken to not 
confuse cladograms with phylogenetic trees; Sober 1991). Notice that 
Species a goes extinct at the speciation event that occurs at time even 
if most or all of the individuals (or their phenotypically unmodified prog­
eny) constituting Species a persist until time t2. As Okasha points out,
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Species b Species c
t Speciation Event
Species a
F igure  2. D iag ram  o f  c lad ist species re la tio n sh ip s before  an d  a fte r specia tion .
this convention is neutral with regard to what constitutes the speciation 
event (Okasha 2003, Note 8).
We will accept without argument Okasha’s account of the conventional 
cladist treatment of lineage splits. In fact, this treatment constitutes the 
core of our response. We simply ask what happens when we require a 
consistent treatment of lineage splits across levels o f  lineage. After all, if 
the question to be decided is whether clade selection is coherent, then we 
ought to be looking at lineages of clades—not, as Okasha does, at lineages 
of species. When we do, we see that monophyly is not fatal to the parent- 
offspring relation for clades (of which much more below), and that state­
ment (2) above is ambiguous; disambiguation here results in conflicting 
truth values. To see this, consider that for the cladist, extinctions do not 
occur only when all the members of a given group cease to exist; by 
definition, generation events are also extinction events whether any of the 
members of the progenitor group die or not.
In light of the two senses of ‘extinction’ it will be useful to introduce 
a distinction between them. Consider two ways a cladist might deem a 
species to have gone extinct. There is first the sense in which Okasha uses 
the term, namely that all the parts of a species may cease to exist (i.e., 
all the individual organisms of a species die). Second there is the sense in 
which a speciation event entails the extinction of a species—despite the 
survival of some or all of the individual organisms of that species. Let’s 
call the former kind of extinction Type I  extinction, and the latter Type
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I I  extinction? To those familiar with evolutionary theory, neither type of 
extinction should come across as unintuitive. Beyond the realm of pro­
fessional biologists, though, Type II extinction is far less intuitive. To 
convince yourself of this, consider why it might be difficult to garner 
general sympathy for a looming Type II extinction of charismatic me­
gafauna. ‘Save the Whales’ has much less political expediency if whale 
populations are booming despite the looming reproductive isolation of a 
particular population of whales!
What we are urging is that without good reasons to do otherwise, 
consistency will require cladists to apply both senses of extinction to clades 
as well as species. Type II extinctions are applied to species, in part, to 
allow for the generation of clean, bifurcating lineages, i.e., it is a useful 
model for representing phylogeny. A similar justification can be appealed 
to for applying type II extinctions to clades, allowing clade lineages to 
be modeled. E.g., applying type II extinctions to species eliminates the 
difficulty of dealing with anagenesis in phylogenetic reconstruction; ap­
plying type II extinctions to clades eliminates analogous anagenetic change 
of compositions of clades. To see the force of this reorientation of Okasha’s 
discussion toward clade-level lineages, consider Figure 3, in which the 
monophyletic lineage of a single species, species a, is shown as it persists 
through five time slices. It should be noted that a-i are all species. The 
relations in the species-lineage cladogram on the left side of Figure 3 are 
those required by the cladist conception of species: each speciation event 
results in two new species and the extinction of the immediate ancestor 
species. Both of Okasha’s conditions are met in this case. Every lineage 
split has species begetting species, satisfying the LMBL condition. Also, 
younger species can outlive their parent species, satisfying the IE con­
dition. It is worth noting that the satisfaction of the IE condition is entailed 
by the cladist treatment of lineage splits. By definition, the parent species 
goes extinct at every speciation event. Again, this holds true even if there 
is a persistence of all the parts of a species across the speciation event 
(i.e., the individual organisms comprising the parent offspring survive 
across f,).
What worries Okasha about applying this analysis to clades is the cladist 
definition of clades as monophyletic groups of species. He takes it that 
this definition requires us to construe the relations between the younger 
clades and the older clades of a particular lineage as a logical relation of 
proper parts to a whole, such that if a more inclusive clade ceases to exist,
3. We’re n o t the  first to  n o te  th is d istinc tion : W ilk inson  (1990) p o in ts  to  it in his 
c ritica l co m m en ta ry  on  R idley  (1989), dub b in g  w hat we call Type II ex tinc tion  
‘H enn ig ian  ex tin c tio n ’.
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Figure  3. Species-level c lad o g ram  w ith its p rogression  o f  clade lineages disp layed 
on th e  righ t. C lades a re  n um bered , and  have been ind iv id u a ted  by listing  the  
an cesto r species before th e  co lon  and  the  tw o m ost w idely sep ara ted  te rm in al 
species a fte r  th e  co lon . Som e clad ists m ig h t include a clade ‘O' a t t0 consisting  
solely o f  species lineage ‘a .  We n o te  th is preference by m ark in g  C lade  1 w ith an 
asterisk .
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all less inclusive clades that are its parts would have to cease to exist as 
well:
[C]lades are by definition monophyletic, and as a matter of logic, 
monophyletic clades cannot stand in ancestor-descendent relations 
with one another: if all higher taxa are required to be monophyletic, 
then ancestral higher taxa do not exist. A taxon which contains all 
the descendants of its members as proper parts cannot be ancestral 
to any other such taxon. (Okasha 2003, 745)
The challenge presented here is whether the part-whole relationship in­
herent in monophyly can be retained while at the same time honoring the 
motivation behind the cladist requirement that lineage splits always result 
in the generation and extinction of taxa. Lacking some principled dis­
tinction between lineage splits at one level and lineage splits at another, 
this requirement can apply to clades as well as species: on this view, older 
clades must go extinct if there are to be any newer clades at all.
Tf consistency is to be any guide, the cladist’s monophyly requirement 
cannot mean that we should always understand younger clades and older 
clades to stand in part-whole relations. How, then, should we understand 
relationships between monophyletic older and younger clades? The answer 
to this question is suggested by the progression of clades displayed on 
the righthand side of Figure 3. Notice that at any given time slice, clades 
persist, go extinct, or are generated from those that go extinct, in just the 
same way as the species lineage is analyzed in the cladogram on the left. 
At t2, for instance, there is an extinction and bifurcation: Clade 1 goes 
extinct because of a cladogenic event that gives rise to Clades 2 and 3.
We, along with Okasha, recognize that clades, like species, are concrete 
spatiotemporal entities, rather than atemporal classes or sets (Ghiselin, 
1974,2002; Hull 1976,1980). The principal difference between our analysis 
and Okasha’s is that we treat clades synchronously, whereas Okasha treats 
clades diachronically. To treat clades synchronously is just to recognize 
that phylogenetic relations obtain at a time. Clades may exist diachron­
ically, but the ‘sister-group’ relation is synchronous. This is similar to the 
‘sibling’ relation; the sibling relation obtains at a time between two broth­
ers, even if that relation depends upon historical facts and persists over 
time. Treating clades synchronously recognizes a vital distinction between 
cladograms and phylogenetic trees; phylogenetic trees display historical 
information, cladograms display sister-group relationships that obtain 
between lineages. (See Mishler and Theriot (2000) for a fuller account of 
synchronic treatment of clades, and for a connection to Hennig’s treatment 
of the tokogenetic-phylogenetic relationship distinction.) This allows us 
to introduce a time index that treats clades as concrete spatiotemporal 
entities that exist and cease to exist at particular times. This is entirely
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consistent with the cladist treatment of species, which are not thought of 
as abstract classes, but as real spatiotemporal entities that engage in lin­
eage-relevant behaviors. As the cladogram in Figure 3 shows, species can 
be tracked as they reproduce, succeed, fail, go extinct, and so on. We 
suggest that analogous events can be tracked of clades when they are 
treated synchronously. We grant that clades are scattered entities, on our 
analysis, but this should not be considered an obstacle to being an in­
dividual in the same way that species are individuals (Baum 1998; Er- 
eshefsky 2001; Ghiselin 1997).
Okasha’s mistake is that he fails to move from the consideration of 
cladograms displaying species-level lineages to something analogous dis­
playing clade-level lineages. This is akin to looking at population-level 
lineages of a single species and trying to infer coherency conditions of 
species selection. This is understandable, as clade-level cladograms are 
not widely available (for the simple reason that biologists do not, at 
present, produce clade-level cladograms). Furthermore, drawing clade- 
level lineages turns out to be a very difficult task. Complexity, though, 
ought not be confused with incoherency. In Figure 4 we offer one sug­
gestion for how to represent a clade-level lineage, mapping it onto the 
lineage used in Figure 3.
Moreover, a synchronic treatment of clades explains why monophyly 
should not be considered a fatal obstacle to clade reproduction. The mono­
phyly condition is typically regarded as satisfied when an ancestral species 
and all its descendants are the parts composing a clade. But monophyly 
cannot be understood this way if we treat clades synchronously. The reason 
for this is straightforward: at any given time slice, a clade may not consist 
of an ancestral species and all its descendants for the simple reason that 
the ancestral species may no longer exist at that time slice. Consider Figure 
4. At f, both species b and species c are extinct, so no clade at f, may 
include either b or c as proper parts.
How, then, should we understand the monophyly requirement while 
construing clades synchronously? The answer, we propose, is that for an 
individual clade to be monophyletic is simply for the parts of that clade, 
at any given time slice, to stand in the proper inclusivity relationships. 
That is, that the parts of a clade should consist of all and only the extant 
descendants of some ancestral species. Furthermore, as suggested above, 
it cannot be the case that monophyly requires that an ancestral species 
(or any extinct species) be a part of the clade it specifies. Extinct ancestral 
species, though, may be a part of an extinct ancestral clade in the clade 
lineage of any given clade. By failing to consider clades synchronously 
from a cladist perspective, Okasha conflates the notion of older and youn­
ger clades with the broad whole-part relations that he takes monophyly 
to require. We argue, however, that monophyly relationships can be re-
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Figure 4. Representing lineages of clades schematically is a challenge. On the left 
side of each diagram is a lineage of species (a i) represented over five time slices 
with various extinctions and generations noted appropriately. ‘Extinction’ 
here is understood as Type 11 extinction (see text). On the right side o f each diagram 
is the corresponding clade lineage. Here Type II extinction and generation events 
are applied to  chides as opposed to species—a convention introduced in the text. 
M onophyletic relations are expressed hierarchically by the relative inclusivity of 
extant clades— retaining the appropriate part-w hole relations entailed by the 
m onophyly relation. The ancestor-descendant relation between clades may also be 
read off the diagram , with younger clades interior to extinct clades. (The parent- 
offspring relation applies to  extinct and generated clades that are, respectively, 
immediately anterior or interior to one other.) Note that the ancestor-descendant 
and part-w hole relations are not equivalent in this diagram. The form er obtains 
over time, whereas the latter obtains at a time— hence the synchronic label.
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tained at any given time slice while respecting the IE condition for re­
lationships among clades. On this analysis, each clade identified in Figure 
3 is monophyletic: each contains all the extant offspring of some ancestral 
species. Notice also that the clades in Figure 4 may be inclusive of each 
other as proper parts. At t4, for example, Clade f , i  includes Clade d,i, 
which in turn includes Clade h,i. Thus, the appropriate inclusivity re­
quirements of monophyly are retained among clades precisely because at 
any given time slice the appropriate part-whole relations hold.
The clade relationships in Figure 4 satisfy the LMBL condition as well, 
since it is clearly not the case, as Okasha alleges, that “if we ask what 
the ancestor of [a given clade] is, then the answer can only be a species, 
not another clade” (Okasha 2003, 745; emphasis in the original). While 
it is true that each cladogenic event is precipitated by a speciation event, 
it is not simply the case in the present example that species are begetting 
clades. To see this, consider any of the younger clades. Clade d,i, for 
instance, is generated at t4, but its ancestor species, species c, has been 
extinct since t2. Species c, then, cannot be said to be the parent of the 
clade. Clade d,i arises from a species-level lineage split—species e goes 
extinct giving rise to species h and i at t4—but species e cannot be the 
parent of the clade, because the clade includes species d, species e’s sister 
species (both of them having arisen at exactly the same time as the result 
of the same speciation event at t2). What does make sense is to say that 
Clade d,i was begotten by Clade d,e. What we are urging, after all, is that 
Clade d,e can be understood as an entity that was generated from a Type 
II extinction event at t2, persisted through ?3, and went Type II extinct at 
t4 precisely because Clade d,i came into existence when species e went 
extinct and gave rise to species h and i.
Conceptualizing of clades and clade reproduction-extinction this way 
may strike some as unintuitive. Indeed, we find it quite unintuitive. How­
ever, this ought not be surprising when we consider some of the unintuitive 
properties a cladist perspective of species and species reproduction- 
extinction entails.
Furthermore, care must be taken to distinguish what counts as the 
‘parent’ of an entity and what counts as the ‘ancestor’ of an entity. We 
do not deny that clades do indeed have species as ancestors. This does 
not preclude clades also having clades as ancestors (and parents). To see 
why this is so, consider the species lineage in Figure 4. Every lineage split 
has species begetting species. This description, though, is in part a function 
of the level of description of the lineage. If we were to describe the spe­
ciation events at a more fine-grained level, then we might describe species 
as having particular populations (or demes?) as their ancestors, yet this 
fact does not preclude us from meaningfully describing species as begetting 
species. This analogy may be clearer if we think about humans. Any
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human is both descended from a single cell and of other humans; iden­
tifying both as ancestors presents no conflict. Tt is simply not the case 
that a single level has exclusive status as an ancestor. The same cannot 
be said of the parent-offspring relation. Okasha is correct that for two 
entities to stand in a parent-offspring relation they must be of the same 
kind. However, as discussed above, the parent-offspring relation can be 
rendered coherent for clades.4
4. Clade Selection: Beyond Mere Coherency? Tn the preceding section we 
make a logically coherent case for clade reproduction. But we recognize 
that whether clades are the kinds of things that are capable of possessing 
adaptations, or competing for resources, or are in actuality a locus of 
selection remains an open question. Here we go beyond considering mere 
coherency, and ask whether one should be optimistic about the results of 
a clade selection research program. Due to space constraints, we only 
sketch the results of our work on this topic.
Several reasons for pessimism suggest themselves. First, if competition 
at a particular level is a necessary condition for the operation of natural 
selection at that level, clade selection can be shown to have a problem— 
somewhat akin to the one Okasha tries to motivate for coherency—that 
species selection does not have. The problem is that some clades share 
parts with other, closely related clades, rendering talk of competition be­
tween those clades incoherent. Tn Figure 5, for example, Clades 1 and 2 
share extant members at tn. These clades overlap—Clade 1 includes extant 
members of Clade 2—in such a way that it will not make sense to speak 
of competition between them, though it will make sense to speak of com­
petition between the extant species that constitute them.
This suggests a third condition necessary for clade selection, on the 
assumption that competition is necessary for selection to occur at a given 
level:
(NOP). Competing clades must have no overlapping parts.
This condition is not fatal to clade selection, as the cladogram in Figure 
5 shows. Clade 3 does not share extant parts with Clade 1 or Clade 2, 
and it is therefore not incoherent to speak of competition between Clade
4. A lterna tive ly , the p aren t-o ffsp rin g  re la tio n  m ay  be rendered  irre levan t to  the 
p ro d u c tio n  o f  lineages fo r th ings like clades. T he stance taken  to w ard s th is p rob lem  
is likely to  be sim ilar to  the  stance taken  to w ards the  qu estio n  o f  w hether a  p aren t- 
o ffspring  re la tion  exists betw een an  asexual u n ice llu lar o rgan ism  an d  the  re su ltan t 
dau g h te r cells th a t occur a fte r d ivision (i.e., does the  o rig ina l o rgan ism  persist?) 
F o r  now, we w ill leave unansw ered  the  q u estion  o f w h a t k inds o f  processes are 
sufficient to  crea te  lineages; suffice to  say th a t  rep ro d u c tio n  qualifies as a  lineage- 
gen era tin g  process (G riesem er 2000a, 2000b).
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3 and the other clades. Whether or not competition occurs between clades 
that meet the NOP condition is a matter for empirical investigation. Our 
hope is that by formulating NOP as a necessary condition for competition 
among clades, we will help investigators identify which clades to include 
and exclude as possible candidates for competition.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we ask whether the relation­
ships in which cladists are interested at the species level—those that are 
empirically or theoretically important—also obtain at the clade level. We 
suggest that what cladists are marking are disruptions of the cohesion 
generating relationships (CGRs) among the parts of a species such that 
new species are generated. What is at stake here is whether there are 
analogous CGR disruptions at the level of clades, and whether marking 
such disruptions is suitably interesting. This is not a question of logical 
coherency, but rather a question of theoretical import and empirical 
evidence.
A third reason for pessimism is that even supposing that clades could 
be identified as possessing an appropriate CGR, other conditions for 
selection seem unlikely to be satisfied. Notably, individual clades rarely 
(if ever) share a selective environment, leaving it unclear how something 
like heritability might apply to clades. Again, the question of shared 
selective environment is not one of coherency, but instead is an empirical 
question.
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5. Conclusion. Clade selection presents many conceptual difficulties. Not 
the least of these is that the cladists’ unintuitive notion of Type TT ex­
tinctions becomes even less natural when it is applied—as consistency 
demands it must—to clades. However thorny clade selection might prove 
to be, though, it has not been shown to be logically incoherent by Okasha’s 
arguments. Tn spite of this, we think Okasha is not terribly far off the 
mark, since there are good empirical and theoretical reasons to be pes­
simistic about whatever fruits there may be of the cladist research 
program.
Clade selection holds disquieting problems for the cladist, even if co­
herency is not one of them. Tt is not worries about coherency that should 
keep the cladist awake at night; rather, the cladist should be concerned 
about whether the theoretical and empirical worries surrounding clade 
selection can be met when coherency is assured.
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